Confidentiality-Preserving Modernize to Databases using TPA

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Abstract—In today’s era we can’t say that our database has a privacy to secure the data because of the fast searching world have advanced the increased risk of privacy disclosure. So far that it is important to protect privacy of user. Many of the algorithm used for the data is not efficient because resulted database easily linked with public database and it reveals the user identity easily. Suppose there exists an anonymous database (e.g. containing medical records) then the objectives include how to still preserve the privacy while updates are being made into the current anonymous database by preserving the privacy of the user and confidentiality of the database. It is required to ensure that the database is still anonymous after the update. In this paper, we propose two methods solving this problem on suppression and generalization based k-anonymous and confidential database but also a new protocol called TPA (Third Party Access) which is directly connected with user and a database system.

Index Terms—Database security, database system, confidential database security.

I. INTRODUCTION

As we know that the use of computers is increasing in great amount, the requirement of privacy of each user and the confidentiality of the database are of the primary importance to the respective organization. There are huge numbers of databases stored in the system and by correlating these databases, private information of any specified user can be obtained. Hence, the database confidentiality and privacy can be a big concern. In this paper, a method is proposed by which it is possible to maintain the privacy of each and every individual and simultaneously devise a method to preserve the confidentiality. Privacy is the data that can be securely shown to the valid owner without leaking the sensitive information from the database. Data confidentiality is the difficulty experienced by the third party to know any sensitive information stored in the database. Privacy is an essential issue in case of transpose sensitive information from one location to another location through internet. This issue is arising in different areas such as census, medical, financial transactions, governmental organizations and industries etc. Confidentiality can be termed as the preservation of information against unauthorized disclosure and limiting data access to authorized users. Data confidentiality is the nondisclosure of certain information except to authorize person.

So problem arises at this point where database needs to be updated. When tuple is to be inserted in the database problem occurs relating to privacy and confidentiality that is database owner decide that whether database preserve privacy without knowing what new tuple to be inserted. To carry out task of privacy, confidentiality to anonymous database, two approaches can be used. One is Suppression and the other is Generalization with a new protocol called TPA (Third Party Access).

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Security-Control Methods for Statistical Databases: A Comparative Study

It was carried in 1989 by N.R. Adam and J.C. Wortmann deals with algorithms for Database anonymization. Here idea of protecting database through data suppression or data perturbation has been extensively investigated. This paper considers the problem of providing security to statistical databases against disclosure of confidential information. Security-control methods suggested in the literature are classified into four general approaches: conceptual, query restriction, data perturbation, and output perturbation. Criteria for evaluating the performance of the various security-control methods are identified. Security-control methods that are based on each of the four approaches are discussed, together with their performance with respect to the identified evaluation criteria. A detailed comparative analysis of the most promising methods for protecting dynamic-online statistical databases is also presented [1].

To date no single security-control method prevents both exact and partial disclosures. There are, however, a few perturbation-based methods that prevent exact disclosure and enable the database administrator to exercise “statistical disclosure control.” Some of these methods, however introduce bias into query responses or suffer from the O/I query set-size problem (i.e., partial disclosure is possible in case of null query set or a query set of size 1). It recommend directing future research efforts toward developing new methods that prevent exact disclosure and provide statistical-disclosure control, while at the same time do not suffer from the bias problem and the O/I query-set-size problem. Furthermore, efforts directed toward developing a bias-correction mechanism and solving the general problem of small query-set-size would help salvage a few of the current perturbation-based methods.
B. K-Anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
It was carried in 2002 by L. Sweeney, The solution provided in this includes a formal protection model named k-anonymity and a set of accompanying policies for deployment. A release provides k-anonymity protection if the information for each person contained in the release cannot be distinguished from at least k-1 individuals whose information also appears in the release. This examines re-identification attacks that can be realized on releases that adhere to anonymity unless accompanying policies are respected [2]. This paper has presented the K-anonymity protection model, explored related attacks and provides the way in which attacks can be thwarted.

C. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Applications
It was carried in 2004 by O. Goldreich, in this paper Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) techniques is mentioned [3]. SMC represents an important class of techniques widely investigated in the area of cryptography. General techniques for performing secure Computations are today available. However, SMC techniques generally are not efficient. Such shortcomings has motivated further research in order to devise more efficient protocols for particular problems.

D. Selective Private Function Evaluation with Application to Private Statistics
It was carried in 2001 by R. Canetti, Y. Ishai, R. Kumar, and M.K. Reiter, R. Rubinfield, and R.N. Wright, in this research direction is related to the area of private information retrieval, which can be seen as an application of the secure multiparty computation techniques to the area of data management. Here, the focus is to devise efficient techniques for posing expressive queries over a database without letting the database know the actual queries [4]

E. Practical Techniques for Searches on Encrypted Data
It was carried in 2000 by D.X. Song, D. Wagner, and A. Perrig. This describes our cryptographic schemes for the problem of searching on encrypted data and provides proofs of security for the resulting.crypto systems approach [5].

F. Information Sharing across Private Databases
It was carried in 2003 by R. Agrawal, A. Evfimievski, and R. Srikant, in this information on integration across databases tacitly assumes that the data in each database can be revealed to the other databases. However, there is an increasing need for sharing information across autonomous entities in such a way that no information apart from the answer to the query is revealed. It formalizes the notion of minimal information sharing across private databases, and develops protocols for intersection, equijoin, intersection size, and equijoin size. It also show how new applications can be built using the proposed protocols [6].

G. Anonymizing Sequential Releases
It was carried in 2006 by K. Wang and B. Fung, An organization makes a new release as new information become available, releases a tailored view for each data request, and releases sensitive information and identifying information separately. The availability of related releases sharpens the identification of individuals by a global quasi-identifier consisting of attributes from related releases. Since it is not an option to anonymize previously released data, the current release must be anonymized to ensure that a global quasi identifier is not effective for identification. In this sequential anonymization problem is studied under Assumption that current release should be anonymized to ensure that a global quasi-identifier is not effective for identification. The issue here is how to anonymized current release so that it cannot link to previous releases yet it remains useful to its own release purpose. It introduce lossy join a negative property in relational database design, as a way to hide the join relationship among releases, and propose a scalable and practical solution [7].

H. Continuous Privacy Preserving Publishing of Data Streams
It was carried in 2008 by Y. Han, J. Pei, B. Jiang, Y. Tao, and Y. Jia., In this study of an emerging problem of continuous privacy preserving publishing of data streams which cannot be solved by any straightforward extensions of the existing privacy preserving publishing methods on static data. To tackle the problem, method has developed a novel approach which considers both the distribution of the data entries to be published and the statistical distribution of the data stream. An extensive performance study using both real data sets and synthetic data sets verifies the effectiveness and the efficiency of our methods[8].

I. Public Key Encryption with keyword Search
It was carried in 2004 by D. Boneh, G. diCrescenzo, R. Ostrowsky, and G. Persiano, in this paper we study the problem of searching on data that is encrypted using a public key system. The paper defines define the concept of public key encryption with keyword search and give several constructions [9].

J. Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
it was carried in 1998 by M. Reed, P. Syverson, and D. Goldschlag, this paper describe Onion routing, it provide infrastructure for providing private communication through public network and also provide anonymous connection that provide strong resistant to eavesdropping and traffic analysis. This describes anonymous connections and their implementation using Onion routing [10].

K. K-anonymity:
The k-anonymity model requires that within any equivalence class of the micro-data there are at least k records. The protection k-anonymity provides is simple and easy to understand. K-anonymity cannot provide a safeguard against attribute disclosure in all cases.
Homogeneity attack and the Background knowledge attack are identified when using K-anonymity.

L. L-Diversity:
From the limitation of k-anonymity l-diversity can be introduced. L-diversity tries to put constraints on minimum number of distinct values seen within an equivalence class for any sensitive attribute.

An equivalence class has l-diversity if there is l or more well-represented values for the sensitive attribute.

A table is said to be l-diverse if each equivalence class of the table is l-diverse.

1) Limitation of L-diversity:
While the ‘-diversity principle represents an important step beyond k-anonymity in protecting against attribute disclosure, it has several shortcomings.

‘l - Diversity may be difficult to achieve and may not provide sufficient privacy protection.

Suppose that the original data have only one sensitive attribute: the test result for a particular virus. It takes two values: positive and negative. Further, suppose that there are 10,000 records, with 99 percent of them being negative, and only 1 percent being positive. Then, the two values have very different degrees of sensitivity. One would not mind being known to be tested negative, because then one is the same as 99 percent of the population, but one would not want to be known/considered to be tested positive. In this case, 2-diversity does not provide sufficient privacy protection for an equivalence class that contains only records that are negative. In order to have a distinct 2-diverse table, there can be at most 10,000 * 1% = 100 equivalence classes and the information loss would be large. Also, observe that because the entropy of the sensitive attribute in the overall table is very small, if one uses entropy ‘l-diversity, it must be set to a small value.

‘l-diversity is insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure.

2) Attacks on l-diversity:

i. Skewness attack:
When the overall distribution is skewed, satisfying that ‘-diversity does not prevent attribute disclosure. Suppose that one equivalence class has an equal number of positive records and negative records. It satisfies distinct 2-diversity, entropy 2-diversity, and any recursive (c, 2)-diversity requirement that can be imposed. However, this presents a serious privacy risk, because anyone in the class would be considered to have 50 percent possibility of being positive, as compared with the 1 percent of the overall population. Now, consider an equivalence class that has 49 positive records and only 1 negative record. It would be distinct 2-diverse and has higher entropy than the overall table (and thus, satisfies any Entropy ‘l-diversity that one can impose), even though anyone in the equivalence class would be considered 98 percent positive, rather than 1 percent. In fact, this equivalence class has exactly the same diversity as a class that has 1 positive and 49 negative record, even though the two classes present very different levels of privacy risks.

ii. Similarity attack
When the sensitive attribute values in an equivalence class are distinct but semantically similar, an adversary can learn important information.

M. 2.13 Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC):
SMC represents an important class of techniques widely investigated in the area of cryptography. General techniques for performing secure computations are today available. However, these techniques generally are not efficient. Such shortcomings has motivated further research in order to devise more efficient protocols for particular problems. Of particular relevance for data management are the techniques presented in which the authors address the problems of efficiently and privately computing set intersection and database oriented operations, such as joins.

N. Top-down specialization (TDS)
It handles both categorical and continuous attributes. TDS starts from the most general state of the table and specializes it by assigning specific values to attributes until violation of the anonymity may occur.

O. Top down Refinement TDR
Fung et al. presented an improved version of TDS which is called "TDR" (Top-Down Refinement). In addition to the capabilities of TDS, TDR is capable of suppressing a categorical attribute with no taxonomy tree. They use a single-dimension recoding, i.e., an aggressive suppression operator that suppresses a certain value in all records without considering values of other attributes so that data that might adhere to k-anonymity might be also suppressed. This "over-suppression" reduces the quality of the anonymous datasets.

P. KADET
Friedman et al. present kADET, a decision tree induction algorithm that is guaranteed to maintain k-anonymity. The main idea is to embed the k-anonymity constraint into the growing phase of a decision tree. While kADET has shown accuracy superior to that of other methods, it is limited to decision trees inducers. It differs from other methods such as TDS and TDR by letting the data owners share with each other the classification models extracted from their own private datasets, rather than to let the data owners publish any of their own private datasets. Thus, the output of kADET is an anonymous decision tree rather than an anonymous dataset.

III. DRAWBACK
The existing methods need to perform manual pre-processing, i.e., generation of a domain generalization taxonomy to define the hierarchy of the categorical attribute values involving prior knowledge about the domain. The domain tree should be prepared separately for every domain. Moreover, there might be disagreements between domain experts about the correct structure of the taxonomy tree, which may lead to differences in the results.
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM:

K-Anonymity is a method for providing privacy preservation by ensuring that data cannot be displayed to an individual. The main purpose is to protect individual privacy. In a k-anonymous dataset, if any identifying information is found in the original dataset with k tuples then first we identify quasi-identifiers i.e. the tuple that clearly distinguish the given tuple in database. Then we are applying for suppression based algorithm. In this algorithm we are identifying quasi-identifiers and we are computing a k-partition which is a collection of disjoint subsets of rows in which each subset contains at least k rows and the union of these subsets is the entire table. And next we are replacing each record having with. In suppression based approach we are applying DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm to encrypt and decrypt data by using the shared key. In this approach we are dealing with encrypted data not directly with the original data. When user enters his information then we are encrypting his information by using DES and we are also encrypting all data in table using same algorithm. If information from user matches with table information this tuple will decrypted and inserted into table. In Generalization based Approach we are replacing the value in table with the more general values. If the data entered by the user matches with the value being replaced by the general value then this record will replaced by the general value and these general values being replaced by the general value then this record will replaced by the general value and these general values being inserted into table.

V. METHODOLOGY

There are three methods will be used:-

i) Suppression-based anonymous database:

In suppression based approach we are applying DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm to encrypt and decrypt data by using the shared key. In this approach we are dealing with encrypted data not directly with the original data. When user enters his information then we are encrypting his information by using DES and we are also encrypting all data in table using same algorithm. If information from user matches with table information this tuple will decrypted and inserted into table. It allows the owner of DB to properly anonymize the tuple t, without gaining any useful knowledge on its contents and without having to send to t’s owner newly generated data. To achieve such goal, the parties secure their messages by encrypting them. In order to perform the privacy-preserving verification of the database anonymity upon the insertion, the parties use a commutative and homomorphic encryption scheme.

In particular, when using a suppression-based anonymization method, we mask with the special value *, the value deployed by person for the anonymization.

Where sensitive information and all information that allows the inference of sensitive information are simply not released.

ii) Generalized-based anonymous database

The second protocol is aimed at generalization-based anonymous databases. In Generalization based Approach we are replacing the value in table with the more general values. If the data entered by the user matches with the value being replaced by the general value then this record will replaced by the general value and these general values being replaced by the general value then this record will replaced by the general value and these general values being inserted into table and it relies on a secure set intersection protocol, to support privacy-preserving updates on a generalization-based k-anonymous DB.

When using a generalization-based anonymization method, original values are replaced by more general ones, according to a priori established value generalization hierarchies (VGHs).

It will rely on a secure set intersection protocol, to support privacy-preserving updates on a k-anonymous database.

iii) Third Party Access:

Third party access(TPA) has a communication between the user and the database. The user directly contact to the TPA for information there is no need for the user to check the encrypted tuples again and again. Same for the loader to anonymized the tuple for crypto.

A channel is a bidirectional communication connection between a program on third protocol and a participant.

![Fig 1 Proposed System Architecture](image)

VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK

The generalization and suppression methods help to preserve data for confidential databases and also help to maintain data privacy. This method used to verify that if new record is being
The objective of devising a private privacy in Microdata Release‖, maintain the k-record in database violate the k-anonymity in terms of number of c. of CSIT protocol in terms of number of [14] Alberto Trombetta, Wei Jaing, Elisa Bertino and Lorenzo Bossi, ―Privacy Preservation Updates to anonymous and Confidential database‖ IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. 8, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2011.

Execution shows that once system verifies user tuple, it can be safely inserted to the database without violating k-anonymity. Only user required to send non suppressed attributes to the k-anonymous database. Thus the database is updated properly using the proposed methods. The data provider’s privacy cannot be violated if user updates a table. If updating any record in database violate the k-anonymity then such updating or insertion of record in table is restricted. If insertion of record satisfies the k-anonymity then such record is inserted in table and suppressed the sensitive information attribute used to maintain the k-anonymity in database. Thus such k-anonymity in table makes difficult for unauthorized user to identify the record.

The important issues in future will be resolved:
1. Implement database for invalid entries.
2. Improving efficiency of protocol in terms of number of messages exchanged between user and database.
3. Implement real world database system.

VII. REFERENCES